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ABSTRACT
Motivated by the problem of simultaneously preserving con-
fidentiality and usability of data outsourced to third-party
clouds, we present two different database encryption schemes
that largely hide data but reveal enough information to sup-
port a wide-range of relational queries. We provide a secu-
rity definition for database encryption that captures con-
fidentiality based on a notion of equivalence of databases
from the adversary’s perspective. As a specific application,
we adapt an existing algorithm for finding violations of pri-
vacy policies to run on logs encrypted under our schemes
and observe low to moderate overheads.
1. INTRODUCTION
To reduce infrastructure costs, small- and medium-sized
businesses may outsource their databases and database ap-
plications to third-party clouds. However, proprietary data
is often private, so storing it in a cloud raises confidential-
ity concerns. Client-side encryption of databases prior to
oursourcing alleviates confidentiality concerns, but it also
makes it impossible to run any relational queries on the
outsourced databases. Several prior research projects have
investigated encryption schemes that trade-off perfect data
confidentiality for the ability to run relational queries [39, 4,
21]. However, these schemes either require client-side pro-
cessing [21], or require additional hardware support [4], or
support a very restrictive set of queries [39]. Our long-term
goal is to develop database encryption schemes that can (1)
run on commodity off-the-shelf (COTS) cloud infrastructure
without any special hardware or any kernel modifications,
(2) support a broad range of relational queries on the en-
crypted database without interaction with the client, and
(3) provide provable end-to-end security and a precise char-
acterization of what information encryption leaks for a given
set of queries. Both in objective and in method, our goal is
similar to that of CryptDB [33], which attains properties (1)
and (2), but not (3).
As a step towards our goal, in this paper, we design two
database encryption schemes, EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH,
with properties (1), (2) and (3). Our design is guided by,
and partly specific to, a single application domain, namely,
audit of data-use logs for violations of privacy policies. This
application represents a real-world problem. For example,
in the US, the healthcare and finance industry must handle
client data in accordance with the privacy portions of the
federal acts Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA) [23] and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
[37] respectively, in addition to state legislation. To remain
compliant with privacy legislation, organizations record logs
of privacy-relevant day-to-day operations such as data ac-
cess/use and employee role changes, and audit these logs
for violations of privacy policies, either routinely or on a
case-by-case basis. Logs can get fairly large and are often
organized in commodity databases. Further, audit is com-
putationally expensive but highly parallelizable, so there is
significant merit in outsourcing the storage of logs and the
execution of audit algorithms to third-party clouds.
Generality. Audit is a challenging application for encryp-
tion schemes because audit requires almost all relational
query operations on logs. These operations include selec-
tion, projection, join, comparison of fields, and what we call
displaced comparison (is the difference between two fields
less than a given constant?). Both our encryption schemes
support all these query operations. The only standard query
operation not commonly required by privacy audit (and not
supported by our schemes) is aggregation (sums and av-
erages; counting queries are supported). Any application
that requires only the query operations listed above can be
adapted to run on EunomiaDET or EunomiaKH, even though
this paper focuses on the audit application only.
EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH trade efficiency and flexibility
in supported queries differently. EunomiaDET uses determin-
istic encryption and has very low overhead (3% to 9% over a
no encryption baseline in our audit application), but requires
anticipating prior to encryption which pairs of columns will
be join-ed in audit queries. EunomiaKH uses Popa et al.’s
adjustable key hash scheme [34, 33] for equality tests and
has higher overhead (63% to 406% in our audit applica-
tion), but removes the need to anticipate join-ed columns
ahead-of-time.
Security. We characterize formally what information about
an encrypted log (database) our schemes may leak to a PPT
adversary with direct access to the encrypted store (mod-
eling a completely adversarial cloud). We prove that by
looking at a log encrypted with either of our schemes, an
adversary can learn (with non-negligible probability) only
that the plaintext log lies within a certain, precisely defined
equivalence class of logs. This class of logs characterizes the
uncertainty of the adversary and, hence, the confidentiality
of the encrypted log [3]. Prior work like CryptDB lacks such
a theorem. CryptDB uses a trusted proxy server to dynam-
ically choose the most secure encryption scheme for every
database column (from a pre-determined set of schemes),
based on the queries being run on that column. While each
scheme is known to be secure in isolation and it is shown that
at any time, a column is encrypted with the weakest scheme
that supports all past queries on the column [?, Theorem 2],
there is no end-to-end characterization of information leaked
after a sequence of queries. (In return, CryptDB supports
all SQL-queries, including aggregation queries, which we do
not.)
Functionality. To demonstrate that our encryption schemes
support nontrivial applications, we adapt an audit algorithm
called reduce from our prior [17] to run on logs encrypted
with either EunomiaDET or EunomiaKH. We implement and
test the adapted algorithm, ereduce, on both schemes and
show formally that it is functionally correct on EunomiaDET.
Since ereduce exercises all the log-query operations listed
above, this is strong evidence that our schemes support
those operations correctly. To run ereduce on EunomiaDET
(EunomiaKH) we need to know prior to encryption (audit)
which columns in the log will be compared for equality or
joined. To this end, we develop a new static analysis of
policies, which we call the EQ mode check.
Privacy audit often requires comparisons of the form “is
timestamp t1 within 30 days of timestamp t2”? We call
such comparisons “displaced comparisons” (30 days is called
the “displacement”). To support displaced comparisons, we
design and prove the security of a new cryptographic sub-
scheme dubbedmOPED (mutable order-preserving encod-
ing with displacement). This scheme extends the mOPE
scheme of Popa et al. [32], which does not support displace-
ments, and may be of independent interest.
Deployability. Both EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH can be
deployed on commodity cloud database systems with some
additional metadata. In both schemes, the client encrypts
individual data cells locally and stores the ciphertexts in
a commodity database system in the cloud (possibly incre-
mentally). Audit runs on the cloud without interaction with
the client and returns encrypted results to the client, which
can decrypt them. The schemes reveal enough information
about the data to perform all supported operations, e.g.,
compare two data values for equality to perform equi-joins.
Contributions. We make the following technical contribu-
tions:
• We introduce two database encryption schemes, EunomiaDET
and EunomiaKH, that support selection, projection, join,
comparison of fields, and displaced comparison queries.
The schemes trade efficiency for the need to predict ex-
pected pairs of join-ed columns before encryption. As
a building block, we develop the sub-schememOPED,
that allows displaced comparison of encrypted values.
• We characterize confidentiality preserved by our schemes
as equivalence classes of plaintext logs and prove that
both our schemes are end-to-end secure.
• We adapt an existing privacy policy audit algorithm to
execute on our schemes. We prove the functional cor-
rectness of the execution of our algorithm on EunomiaDET.
• We implement both our schemes and the adapted audit
algorithm, observing low overheads on EunomiaDET and
moderate overheads on EunomiaKH.
Notation. This paper is written in the context of the pri-
vacy audit application and our encryption schemes are pre-
sented within this context. Accordingly, we sometimes use
the term “log” or “audit log” when the more general term
“database” could have been used and, similarly, use the term
“policy” or “privacy policy” when the more general term
“query” could have been used. We expect our schemes to
generalize to other database applications straightforwardly.
2. OVERVIEW OF EUNOMIA
We first present the architecture of Eunomia. Then, we
motivate our choice of encryption schemes through examples
and discuss policy audit in Eunomia in more detail. Finally,
we discuss our goals, assumptions, and adversary model.
2.1 Architecture of Eunomia
We consider the scenario where an organization, called
the client or Cl, with sensitive data and audit requirements
wishes to outsource its log (organized as a relational database)
and audit process (implemented as a sequence of policy-
dependent queries) to a potentially compromisable third-
party cloud server, denoted CS. Cl generates the log from its
day-to-day operations. Cl then encrypts the log and trans-
fers the encrypted log to the CS. Cl initiates the audit pro-
cess by choosing a policy. The auditing algorithm runs on
the CS infrastructure and the audit result containing en-
crypted values is sent to Cl, which can decrypt the values in
the result.
The mechanism of log generation is irrelevant for us. From
our perspective, a log is a pre-generated database with a
public schema, where each table defines a certain privacy-
relevant predicate. For example, the table Roles may con-
tain columns Name and Role, and may define the mapping of
Cl’s employees to Cl’s organizational roles. Similarly, the ta-
ble Sensitive accesses may contain columns Name, File name,
and Time, recording who accessed which sensitive file at
what time. Several tables like Sensitive accesses may con-
tain columns with timestamps, which are integers.
2.2 Encryption Schemes
An organization may na¨ıvely encrypt the entire log with
a strong encryption scheme before transferring it to a cloud,
but this renders the stored log ineffective for audit, as audit
(like most other database computations) must relate differ-
ent parts of the log. For example, suppose the log contains
two tables T1 and T2. T1 lists the names of individuals who
accessed patients’ prescriptions. T2 lists the roles of all in-
dividuals in the organization. Consider the privacy policy:
Policy 1: Every individual accessing patients’ prescriptions
must be in the role of Doctor.
The audit process of the above policy must read names
from T1 and test them for equality against the list of names
under the role Doctor in T2. This forces the use of an en-
cryption method that allows equality tests (or equi-joins).
Unsurprisingly, this compromises the confidentiality of the
log, as an adversary (e.g., the cloud host, which observes the
audit process) can detect equality between encrypted fields
(e.g., equality of names in T1 and T2). However, not all is
lost: for instance, if per-cell deterministic encryption is used,
the adversary cannot learn the concrete names themselves.
A second form of data correlation necessary for audit is the
order between time points. Consider the following policy:
Policy 2: If an outpatient’s medical record is accessed by
an employee of the Billing Department, then the outpatient
must have visited the medical facility in the last one month.
Auditing this policy requires checking whether the dis-
tance between the timestamps in an access table and the
timestamps in a patient visit table is shorter than a month.
In this case, the encryption scheme must reveal not just
the relative order of two timestamps but also the order be-
tween a timestamp and another timestamp displaced by one
month. Similar to Policy 1, the encryption scheme must
reveal equality between patient names in the two tables.
To strike a balance between functional (audit) and con-
fidentiality requirements, we investigate two cryptographic
schemes, namely EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH, to encrypt
logs. Each cell in the database tables is encrypted indi-
vidually. All cells in a column are encrypted using the same
key. EunomiaDET uses deterministic encryption to support
equality tests; two columns that might be tested for equal-
ity by subsequent queries are encrypted with the same key.
EunomiaDET requires that log columns that might be tested
for equality during audit are known prior to the encryption.
Audit under EunomiaDET is quite efficient. However, adapt-
ing encrypted logs to audit different policies that require
different column equality tests requires log re-encryption,
which is costly. Our second scheme EunomiaKH handles fre-
quent policy updates efficiently. EunomiaKH relies on the ad-
justable key hash scheme [34, 33] for equality tests. A trans-
fer token is generated for each pair of columns needed to be
tested for equality prior to audit. EunomiaKH additionally
stores keyed hashes of all cells. Audit under EunomiaKH re-
quires the audit algorithm to track the provenance of the ci-
phertext (i.e., from which table, which column the ciphertext
originated) and is less efficient than audit under EunomiaDET.
To support timestamp comparison with displacement (shown
in Policy 2) the mOPED scheme, described in Section 4,
is used by both EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH. Like its prede-
cessor, mOPE [32], the scheme adds an additional search
tree (additional metadata) to the encrypted database on
CS. (Supporting displacements is necessary for a practi-
cal audit system because privacy regulations use displace-
ments to express obligation deadlines. Out of 84 HIPAA pri-
vacy clauses, 7 use displacements. Cignet Health of Prince
George’s County, Maryland was fined $1.3 million for vio-
lating one of these clauses, §164.524.)
The encrypted database has a schema derived from the
schema of the plaintext database and may be stored on CS
using any standard database management systems (DBMS).
The DBMS may be used to index the encrypted cells. As
shown in [17], database indexing plays a key role in improv-
ing the efficiency of the audit process. Hence, we develop
our encryption scheme in such a way that it is possible to
leverage database indexing supported by commodity DBMS.
2.3 Policies and audit
Privacy policies may be extracted from privacy legisla-
tion like HIPAA [23] and GLBA [37], or from internal com-
pany requirements. Technically, a privacy policy specifies a
constraint on the log. For example, Policy 1 of Section 1
requires that any name appearing in table T1 appear in ta-
ble T2 with role Doctor. Generally, policies can be complex
and may mention various entities, roles, time, and subjec-
tive beliefs. For instance, DeYoung et al.’s formalization of
the HIPAA and GLBA Privacy Rules span over 80 and 10
pages, respectively [16]. We represent policies as formulas of
first-order logic (FOL) because we find it technically conve-
nient and because FOL has been demonstrated in prior work
to be adequate for representing policies derived from exist-
ing privacy legislation (DeYoung et al., mentioned above,
use the same representation). We describe this logic-based
representation of policies in Section 3.
Our audit algorithm adapts our prior algorithm, reduce [17],
that works on policies represented in FOL. This algorithm
takes as input a policy and a log and reduces the policy
by checking the policy constraints on the log. It outputs
constraints that cannot be checked due to lack of informa-
tion (missing log tables, references to future time points, or
need for human intervention) in the form of a residual policy.
Similar to reduce, our adapted algorithm, ereduce, uses
database queries as the basic building block. Our encryption
schemes permit queries with selection, projection, join, com-
parison and displaced comparison operations. Our schemes
do not support queries like aggregation (which would re-
quire an underlying homomorphic encryption scheme and
completely new security proofs).
To run reduce on EunomiaDET, we need to identify columns
that are tested for equality. This information is needed
prior to encryption for EunomiaDET and prior to audit for
EunomiaKH, as explained in Section 4. We develop a static
analysis of policies represented in FOL, which we call the
EQ mode check, defined in Section 7, to determine which
columns may need to be compared for equality when the
policy is audited.
2.4 Adversary model and Security Goals
Assumptions and threat model. In our threat model, Cl
is trusted but CS is an honest but curious adversary with the
following capability: CS can run any polynomial time algo-
rithm on the stored (encrypted) log, including the audit over
any policy. We assume that Cl generates keys and encrypts
the log with our encryption schemes before uploading it to
CS. Audit runs on the CS infrastructure but (by design) it
does not perform decryption. Hence, CS never sees plaintext
data or the keys, but CS can glean some information about
the log, e.g., the order of two fields or the equality of two
fields. The output of audit may contain encrypted values
indicating policy violations, but these values are decrypted
only at Cl.
We assume that privacy policies are known to the adver-
sary. This assumption may not be true for an organization’s
Atoms P ::= p(t1, . . . , tn) | timeOrder(t1, d1, t2, d2) |
t1 = t2
Guard g ::= P | ⊤ | ⊥ | g1 ∧ g2 | g1 ∨ g2 | ∃x.g
Formula ϕ ::= P | ⊤ | ⊥ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 |
∀~x.(g → ϕ) | ∃~x.(g ∧ ϕ)
Figure 1: Policy specification logic syntax
internal policies, but relaxing this assumption only simpli-
fies our formal development. To audit over logs encrypted
with EunomiaDET, any constants appearing in the policy (like
“Doctor” in Policy 1 of Section 1) must be encrypted be-
fore the audit process starts, so CS can recover the associ-
ation between ciphertext and plaintexts of constants that
appear in the (publicly known) privacy policy. Similarly,
in EunomiaKH, the hashes of constants in policies must be
revealed to the adversary. in a set
Security and functionality goals. (Confidentiality) Our
primary goal is to protect the confidentiality of the log’s
content, despite any compromise of CS, including its infras-
tructure, employees, and the audit process running on it.
(Expressiveness) Our system should be expressive enough to
represent and audit privacy policies derived from real legis-
lation. In our evaluation, we work with privacy rules derived
from HIPAA and GLBA.
Log equivalence. Central to the definition of the end-to-
end security property that we prove of our EunomiaDET and
EunomiaKH is the notion of log equivalence. It characterizes
what information about the database remains confidential
despite a complete compromise of CS. Our security defi-
nition states that the adversary can only learn that the log
belongs to a stipulated equivalence class of logs. The coarser
our equivalence, the stronger our security theorem.
For semantically secure encryption, we could say that two
logs are equivalent if they are the same length. When the
encryption permits join, selection, comparison and dispaced
comparison queries, this definition is too strong. For exam-
ple, the attacker must be allowed to learn that two constants
on the log (e.g., Doctor and Nurse) are not equal if they lie
in different columns that the attacker can try to join. Hence,
we need a refined notion of log equivalence, which we for-
malize in Section 5.2.
3. POLICY AND LOG SPECIFICATIONS
We review the logic that we use to represent privacy poli-
cies and give a formal definition of logs (databases). These
definitions are later used in the definition and analysis of
our encryption schemes and the ereduce audit algorithm.
Policy logic. We use the guarded-fragment of first-order
logic introduced in [1] to represent privacy policies. The
syntax of the logic is shown in Figure 1. Policies or formulas
are denoted ϕ. Terms t are either constants c, d drawn from
a domain D or variables x drawn from a set Var. (Func-
tion symbols are disallowed.) ~t denotes a list of terms. The
basic building block of formulas is atoms, which represent
relations between terms. We allow three kinds of atoms.
First, p(t1, . . . , tn) represents a relation which is established
through a table named p in the audit log. The symbol p
is called a predicate (or, interchangeably, a table). The set
of all predicate symbols is denoted by P. An arity function
α : P → N specifies how many arguments each predicate
takes (i.e., how many columns each table has). Second, for
numerical terms, we allow comparison after displacement
with constants, written timeOrder(t1, d1, t2, d2). This rela-
tion means that t1 + d1 ≤ t2 + d2. Here, d1, d2 must be
constants. Third, we allow term equality, written t1 = t2.
Although we restrict atoms of the logic to these three cat-
egories only, the resulting fragment is still very expressive.
All the HIPAA- and GLBA-based policies tested in prior
work [17] and all but one clause of the entire HIPAA and
GLBA privacy rules formalized by DeYoung et al. [16] lie
within this fragment.
Formulas or policies, denoted ϕ, contain standard logical
connectives ⊤ (“true”), ⊥ (“false”), ∧ (“and”), ∨ (“or”), ∀x
(“for every x”) and ∃x (“for some x”). Saliently, the form of
quantifiers ∀x and ∃x is restricted: Each quantifier must in-
clude a guard, g. As shown in [17], this restriction, together
with the mode check described in Section 7, ensures that au-
dit terminates (in general, the domain D may be infinite).
Intuitively, one may think of a policy ϕ as enforcing a con-
straint on the predicates it mentions, i.e., on the tables of
the log. A guard g may be thought of as a query on the log
(indeed, the syntax of guards generalizes Datalog, a well-
known database query language). The policy ∀~x.(g → ϕ)
may be read as “for every result ~x of the query g, the con-
straint ϕ must hold.” Dually, ∃~x.(g ∧ ϕ) may be read as
“some result ~x of the query g must satisfy the constraint ϕ.”
Example 1. Consider the following policy, based on §6802(a)
of the GLBA privacy law:
∀p1, p2,m, q, a, t. (send(p1, p2,m, t)∧
tagged(m,q, a) ∧ activeRole(p1, institution)∧
notAffiliateOf(p2, p1, t) ∧ customerOf(q, p1, t) ∧ attr(a,npi))
→
(
(∃t1,m1.send(p1, q,m1, t1) ∧ timeOrder(t1, 0, t, 0)∧
timeOrder(t, 0, t1, 30) ∧ discNotice(m1, p1, p2, q, a, t))∨
(∃t2,m2.send(p1, q,m2, t2) ∧ timeOrder(t, 0, t2, 0)∧
timeOrder(t2, 0, t, 30) ∧ discNotice(m2, p1, p2, q, a, t))
)
The policy states that principal p1 can send a message m to
principal p2 at time t where the messagem contains principal
q’s attribute a (e.g., account number) and (i) p1 is in the
role of a financial institution, (ii) p2 is not a third-party
affiliate of p1 at time t, (iii) q is a customer of p1 at time
t, (iv) the attribute a is non-public personal information
(npi, e.g., a social security number) only if any one of the
two conditions separated by ∨ holds. The first condition
says that the institution has already sent a notification of
this disclosure in the past 30 days to the customer q (i.e.,
0 ≤ (t − t1) ≤ 30). The second condition says that the
institution will send a notification of this disclosure within
the next 30 days (i.e., 0 ≤ (t2 − t) ≤ 30).
Logs and schemas. An audit log or log, denoted L, is a
database with a given schema. A schema S is a set of pairs
of the form 〈tableName, columnNames〉 where columnNames
is an ordered list of all the column names in the table (pred-
icate) tableName. A schema S corresponds to a policy ϕ if
S contains all predicates mentioned in the policies ϕ, and
the number of columns in predicate p is α(p).
Semantically, we may view a log L as a function that given
as argument a variable-free atom p(~t) returns either ⊤ (the
entry ~t exists in table p in L) or ⊥ (the entry does not exist).
To model the possibility that a log table may be incomplete,
we allow for a third possible response uu (unknown). In our
implementation, the difference between uu and ⊥ arises from
an additional bit on the table p indicating whether or not
the table may be extended in future. Formally, we say that
log L1 extends log L2, written L1 ≥ L2 when for every p
and ~t, if L2(p(~t)) 6= uu, then L1(p(~t)) = L2(p(~t)). Thus,
the extended log L1 may determinize some unknown entries
from L2, but cannot change existing entries in L2.
Our logic uses standard semantics of first-order logic, treat-
ing logs as models. The semantics, written L |= ϕ, take into
account the possibility of unknown relations; we refer the
reader to [17] for details (these details are not important for
understanding this paper). Intuitively, if L |= ϕ, then the
policy ϕ is satisfied on the log L; if L 6|= ϕ, then the policy
is violated; and if neither holds then the log does not have
enough information to determine whether or not the policy
has been violated.
Example 2. The policy in Example 1 can be checked for vi-
olations on a log whose schema contains tables send, tagged,
activeRole, notAffiliateOf, customerOf, attr and discNotice
with 4, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2 and 6 columns respectively. In this
audit, values in several columns may have to be compared
for equality. For example, the values in the first columns
of tables send and activeRole must be compared because,
in the policy, they contain the same variable p1. Similarly,
timestamps must be compared after displacement with con-
stants 0 and 30. The log encryption schemes we define next
support these operations.
4. ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
We present our two log encryption schemes, EunomiaDET
and EunomiaKH in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 respectively.
Both schemes use (as a black-box) a new sub-scheme,mOPED,
for comparing timestamps after displacement, which we present
in Section 4.4.
4.1 Preliminaries
We introduce common constructs used through out the
rest of this section.
Equality scheme. To support policy audit, we determine,
through a static analysis of the policies to be audited, which
pairs of columns in the log schema may have be tested for
equality or joined. We defer the details of this policy analysis
to Section 7. For now, we just assume that the result of this
analysis is available. This result, called an equality scheme,
denoted δ, is a set of pairs of the form 〈p1.a1, p2.a2〉. The
key property of δ is that if, during audit, column a1 of table
p1 is tested for equality against column a2 of table p2, then
〈p1.a1, p2.a2〉 ∈ δ.
Policy constants. Policies may contain constants. For in-
stance, the policy of Example 1 contains the constants npi,
institution, 0 and 30. Before running our audit algorithm
over encrypted logs, a new version of the policy contain-
ing these constants in either encrypted (for EunomiaDET) or
keyed hash (for EunomiaKH) form must be created. Conse-
quently, the adversary, who observes the audit and knows
the plaintext policy, can learn the encryption or hash of
these constants. Hence, these constants play an important
role in our security definitions. The set of all these policy
constants is denoted C.
Displacement constants. Constants which feature in the
2nd and 4th argument positions of the predicate timeOrder()
play a significant role in construction of the mOPED en-
coding and our security definition. These constants are
called displacements, denoted D. For instance, in Example
1, D = {0, 30}. For any policy, D ⊆ C.
Encrypting timestamps. We assume (conservatively) that
all timestamps in the plaintext log may be compared to each
other, so all timestamps are encrypted (in EunomiaDET) or
hashed (in EunomiaKH) with the same key Ktime. This key is
also used to protect values in themOPED sub-scheme. The
assumption of all timestamps may be compared with each
other, can be restricted substantially (for both schemes) if
the audit policy is fixed ahead of time.
4.2 EunomiaDET
The log encryption scheme EunomiaDET encrypts each cell
individually using deterministic encryption. All cells in a
column are encrypted with the same key. Importantly, if
cells in two columns may be compared during audit (as de-
termined by the equality scheme δ), then the two columns
also share the same key. Hence, cells can be tested for equal-
ity simply by comparing their ciphertexts. To allow times-
tamp comparison after displacement, the encrypted log is
paired with amOPED encoding of timestamps that we ex-
plain later. Note that it is possible to replace deterministic
encryption with a cryptographically secure keyed hash and
a semantically secure ciphertext to achieve the same func-
tionality (the keyed hash value could be used to check for
equality). However, this design incurs higher space overhead
than our design with deterministic encryption.
Technically, EunomiaDET contains the following three al-
gorithms: KeyGenDET(1κ,S , δ), EncryptLogDET(L,S ,K), and
EncryptPolicyConstantsDET(ϕ,K).
Key generation. The probabilistic algorithm KeyGenDET(·,
·, ·) takes as input the security parameter κ, the plaintext
log schema S , and an equality scheme δ. It returns a key set
K. The key set K is a set of triples of the form 〈p, a, k〉. The
triple means that all cells in column a of table p must be en-
crypted (deterministically) with key k. The constraints on K
are that (a) if p.a contains timestamps, then k = Ktime, and
(b) if 〈p1.a1, p2.a2〉 ∈ δ, 〈p1, a1, k1〉 ∈ K and 〈p2, a2, k2〉 ∈ K,
then k1 = k2.
Encrypting the log. The algorithm EncryptLogDET(·, ·, ·)
takes as input a plaintext log L, its schema S , and the key set
K generated by KeyGen(). It returns a pair eL = 〈eDB, eT 〉
where, eDB is the cell-wise encryption of L with appropriate
keys from K and eT is the mOPED encoding.
Encrypting constants in the policy. To audit over logs
encrypted with EunomiaDET, constants in the policy must
be encrypted too (else, we cannot check whether or not an
atom mentioning the constant appears in the encrypted log).
The algorithm EncryptPolicyConstantsDET(·, ·) takes as input
a plaintext policy ϕ, and a key set K, and returns a policy
ϕ′ in which constants have been encrypted with appropriate
keys. The function works as follows: If, in ϕ, the constant c
appears in the ith position of predicate p, then in ϕ′, the ith
position of p is c deterministically encrypted with the key of
the ith column of p (as obtained from K). Other than this,
ϕ and ϕ′ are identical.
Remarks. The process of audit on a log encrypted with
EunomiaDET requires no cryptographic operations. Com-
pared to an unencrypted log, we only pay the overhead
of having to compare longer ciphertexts and some cost for
looking up the mOPED encoding to compare timestamps.
However, auditing for a policy that requires equality tests
beyond those prescribed by an equality scheme δ is impos-
sible on a log encrypted for δ. To do so, we would have
to re-encrypt parts of the log, which is a slow operation.
Our second log encryption scheme, EunomiaKH, represents a
different trade-off.
4.3 EunomiaKH
EunomiaKH relies on the adjustable keyed hash (AKH)
scheme [34, 33] to support equality tests. We review AKH
and then describe how we build EunomiaKH on it.
Abstractly, AKH provides three functions: Hash(k, v) =
P × DET(kmaster, v) × k (P is a point on an elliptic curve,
DET(·, ·) is the deterministic encryption function, and kmaster
is a master encryption key), Token(k1, k2) = k2 × k
−1
1 and
Adjust(w,∆) = w × ∆. Hash(k, v) returns a keyed hash of
v with key k on a pre-determined elliptic curve with public
parameters. Token(k1, k2) returns a token ∆k1 7→k2 , which
allows transforming hashes created with key k1 to corre-
sponding hashes created with k2. The function Adjust(w,∆)
performs this transformation: If w = Hash(k1, v) and ∆ =
∆k1 7→k2 , then Adjust(w,∆) returns the same value as Hash(k2, v).
The AKH scheme allows the adversary to compare two val-
ues hashed with keys k1 and k2 for equality only when it
knows either ∆k1 7→k2 or ∆k2 7→k1 . Popa et al. prove this
security property, reducing it to the elliptic-curve decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption [34].
To encrypt a log in EunomiaKH, we generate two keys
kh, ke for each column. These are called the hash key and
the encryption key, respectively. Each cell v in the col-
umn is transformed into a pair 〈Hash(kh, v),Encrypt(ke, v)〉.
Here, Hash(kh, v) is the AKH hash of v with key kh and
Encrypt(ke, v) is a standard probabilistic encryption of v
with key ke.
1 Columns do not share any keys. If audit on
a policy requires testing columns t1.a1 and t2.a2 for equality
and these columns have hash keys kh1 and kh2 , then the
audit algorithm is given one of the tokens ∆kh1 7→kh2 and
∆kh2 7→kh1 . The algorithm can then transform hashes to
test for equality. Each execution of the audit process can be
given a different set of tokens depending on the policy being
audited and, hence, unlike EunomiaDET, the same encrypted
log supports audit over any policy. However, equality test-
ing is more expensive now as it invokes the Adjust() function.
This increases the runtime overhead of audit.
Formally, EunomiaKH contains the following four algorithms:
KeyGenKH(1κ,S), EncryptLogKH(L,S ,K), EncryptPolicyConsta
ntsKH(ϕ,K), and GenerateToken(S , δ,K).
Key generation. The probabilistic algorithm KeyGenKH(·, ·)
takes as input a security parameter and a log schema S
and returns a key set K. K contains tuples of the form
1 The Encrypt(ke, v) component of the ciphertext is returned
to the client Cl as part of the audit output. Cl then decrypts
it to obtain concrete policy violations.
〈p, a, kh, ke〉, meaning that column p.a has hash key kh and
encryption key ke. The only constraint is that if p.a contains
timestamps, then kh = Ktime.
Encrypting the log. The algorithm EncryptLogKH(·, ·, ·)
takes as arguments a plaintext log L, its schema S and a
key set K. It returns a pair eL = 〈eDB, eT 〉 where, eDB is
the cell-wise encryption of L with appropriate keys from K
and eT is the mOPED encoding. Because each cell maps
to a pair, each table has twice as many columns in eDB as
in L.
Encrypting policy constants. To audit over EunomiaKH
encrypted logs, constants in the policy must be encrypted.
The algorithm EncryptPolicyConstantsKH(·, ·) takes as input
a plaintext policy ϕ, and a key set K, and returns a policy
ϕ′ in which constants have been encrypted with appropriate
keys taken from K: If constant c appears in the ith position
of predicate p in ϕ and the hash and encryption keys of the
ith column of p in K are kh and ke, respectively, then the
constant c is replaced by 〈Hash(kh, v),Encrypt(ke, v)〉 in ϕ
′.
Generating tokens. GenerateToken(·, ·, ·) is used to gen-
erate tokens that are given to the audit algorithm to enable
it to test for equality on the encrypted log. For each tu-
ple 〈p.a1, q.a2〉 in δ, the algorithm GenerateToken(S , δ,K) re-
turns the tuple 〈p.a1, q.a2,∆k1 7→k2〉, where 〈p, a1, k1, 〉 ∈ K
and 〈q, a2, k2, 〉 ∈ K.
Remark. From the perspective of confidentiality, the same
amount of information is revealed irrespective of whether the
audit algorithm (which may be compromised by the adver-
sary) is given ∆kh1 7→kh2 or ∆kh2 7→kh1 , because each token
can be computed from the other. However, the actual token
used for comparison by the audit algorithm can have a sig-
nificant impact on its performance. Consider Policy 1 from
Section 1, which stipulates that each name appearing in ta-
ble T1 appear in T2 with the role Doctor. The audit process
will iterate over the names in T1 and look up those names in
T2. Consequently, for performance, it makes sense to index
the hashes of the names in T2 and for the audit algorithm to
use the token ∆k1 7→k2 , where k1 and k2 are the hash keys of
names in T1 and T2, respectively. If, instead, the algorithm
uses ∆k2 7→k1 , then indexing is ineffective and performance
suffers. The bottom line is that directionality of information
flow during equality testing matters for EunomiaKH. Our
policy analysis, which determines the columns that may be
tested for equality during audit (Section 7) takes this di-
rectionality into account. The equality scheme δ returned
by this analysis is directional (even though the use of δ in
EunomiaDET ignored this directionality): if 〈p1.a1, p2.a2〉 ∈ δ,
and p1.a1 and p2.a2 have hash keys k1 and k2, then the audit
algorithm uses the token ∆k1 7→k2 , not ∆k2 7→k1 .
4.4 Mutable Order Preserving Encoding with
Displacements (mOPED)
We now discuss the mOPED scheme which produces a
data structure, eT , that allows computation of the boolean
value t1 + d1 ≤ t2 + d2 on the cloud, given only Enc(t1),
Enc(t2), Enc(d1) and Enc(d2). Here, Enc(t) denotes the de-
terministic encryption of t (in the case of EunomiaDET) or
the AHK hash of t (in the case of EunomiaKH) with the fixed
key Ktime. The scheme mOPED extends a prior scheme
mOPE [32], which is a special case d1 = d2 = 0 of our
scheme.
Consider first the simple case where the log L and the
policy ϕ are fixed. This means that the set T of values of
the form t+ d that the audit process may compare to each
other is also fixed and finite (because t is a timestamp on
the finite log L and d ∈ D is a displacement occurring in
the finite policy ϕ). Suppose that the set T has size N
(note that N ∈ O(|D| · |L|). Then, the client can store on
the cloud a map eT : EncTimeStamp× EncD→ {1, . . . , N},
which maps each encrypted timestamp Enc(t) and each en-
crypted displacement Enc(d) to the relative order of t + d
among the elements of T . To compute t1+ d1 ≤ t2+ d2, the
audit process can instead compute eT (Enc(t1),Enc(d1)) ≤
eT (Enc(t2),Enc(d2)). The map eT can be represented in
many different ways. In our implementation, we use nested
hash tables, where the outer table maps Enc(t) to an inner
hash table and the inner table maps Enc(d) to the relative
order of t+d. For audit applications where the log and policy
are fixed upfront, this simple data structure eT suffices.
The scheme mOPED is more general and allows the
client to incrementally update eT on the cloud. This is
relevant when either the policy or the log changes often. A
single addition or deletion of t or d can cause the map eT to
change for potentially all other elements and, hence, a naive
implementation of eT may incur cost linear in the current
size of T for single updates. Popa et al. show how this cost
can be made logarithmic by interactively maintaining a bal-
anced binary search tree over encrypted values Enc(t) and
using paths in this search tree as the co-domain of eT . We
extend this approach by maintaining a binary search tree
over pairs (Enc(t),Enc(d)), where the search order reflects
the natural order over t + d. Since the cloud never sees
plaintext data, the update of this binary search tree and the
map eT must be interactive with the client. We omit the
details of this interactive update and refer the reader to [32]
for details. As the cloud may be compromised, the security
property we prove of mOPED (Section 5.1) holds despite
the adversary observing every interaction with the client.
We note that an audit algorithm never updates eT , so its
execution remains non-interactive.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now prove that our schemes EunomiaDET, EunomiaKH
and mOPED are secure. We start with mOPED, because
EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH rely on it.
5.1 Security of mOPED
We formalize the security of mOPED as an indistin-
guishability game in which the adversary provides two se-
quences of timestamps and a set of displacements D, then
observes the client and server construct the mOPED data
structure eT on one of these sequences chosen randomly and
then tries to guess which sequence it is. We call this game
IND-CDDA (indistinguishability under chosen distances with
displacement attack). This definition is directly based on the
IND-OCPA (indistinguishability under ordered chosen plain-
text attack) definition by Boldyreva et al. [8] and the LoR
security definition by Pandey and Rouselakis [31]. Because
eT intentionally reveals the relative order of all timestamps
after displacement with constants in D, we need to impose
a constraint on the two sequences chosen by the adversary.
Let ~u[i] denote the ith element of the sequence ~u. We say
that two sequences of timestamps ~u and ~v are equal up
to distances with displacements D, written EDD(~u,~v,D) iff
|~u| = |~v| and ∀d, d′ ∈ D, i, j. (~u[i]+d ≥ ~u[j]+d′)⇔ (~v[i]+d ≥
~v[j] + d′). We describe here the IND-CDDA game and the
security proof for mOPED with deterministic encryption;
the case of mOPED with AKH hashes is similar.
IND-CDDA game. The IND-CDDA security game between
a client or challenger Cl (i.e., owner of the audit log) and
an adaptive, probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) adversary
Adv for the security parameter κ proceeds as follows:
1. Cl generates a secret key Ktime using the probabilistic
key generation algorithm KeyGen. Ktime
$
← KeyGen(1κ).
2. Cl chooses a random bit b. b
$
← {0, 1}.
3. Cl creates an empty eT on the cloud.
4. Adv chooses a set of distances D = {d1, . . . , dn} and
sends it to Cl.
5. Cl and Adv engage in a polynomial of κ number of
rounds of interactions. In each round j:
(a) Adv selects two values v0j and v
1
j and sends them
to Cl.
(b) Cl deterministically encrypts the following n + 1
values vbj , v
b
j +d1, v
b
j +d2, . . . , v
b
j +dn using Ktime.
(c) Cl interacts with the cloud to insert DET(Ktime, v
b
j)
and {DET(Ktime, v
b
j + di)}
n
i=1 into eT . The ad-
versary observes this interaction and the cloud’s
complete state, but not Cl’s local computation.
6. Adv outputs his guess b′ of b.
Adv wins the IND-CDDA security game iff:
1. Adv guesses b correctly (i.e., b = b′);
2. EDD([v00 , . . . , v
0
m], [v
1
0 , . . . , v
1
m], D) holds, wherem is the
number of rounds played in the game.
Let winAdv,κ be a random variable which is 1 if the Adv
wins and 0 if Adv loses. Recall that a function f : N →
R is negligible with respect to its argument κ, if for every
c ∈ N there exists another integer K such that for all κ >
K, f(κ) < x−c. We write negl(κ) to denote some neglible
function of κ.
Theorem 1 (Security of mOPED with deterministic
encryption) Assuming that deterministic encryption is a
pseudorandom function, ourmOPED scheme is IND-CDDA
secure, i.e., Pr[winAdv,κ = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(κ) where the proba-
bility is taken over the random coins used by Adv as well as
the random coins used in choosing the key and the bit b.
Proof. By a hybrid argument. We augment a similar
proof of security for the mOPE scheme [32] to also take
displacements D into account.
Security of mOPED with AKH hash. The security
game for mOPED with AKH hashes is very similar to
IND-CDDA. We replace DET(·, ·) with Hash(·, ·) in the game.
The proof is in the standard model and reduces to the secu-
rity of AKH [34, Definition 4] and finally to the elliptic-curve
decisional Diffie-Hellman (ECDDH) assumption.
5.2 Security of EunomiaDET
We prove security for EunomiaDET, formalized as an in-
distinguishability game. We first define a notion of log
equivalence that characterizes the confidentiality achieved
by EunomiaDET (and, as we explain later, by EunomiaKH).
This notion is a central contribution of our work. The se-
curity theorem in this section shows that by looking at the
EunomiaDET encryption of a log, a PPT adversary can learn
only that the log belongs to its equivalence class (with non-
negligible probability). Hence, the equivalence class of the
log represents the uncertainty of the adversary about the
log’s contents and, therefore, characterizes what confiden-
tiality the scheme provides.
Definition 1 (Plaintext log equivalence)Given two plain-
text audit logs L1 and L2, an equality scheme δ, a set of
constants C and a set of displacements D ⊆ C, L1 and L2
are equivalent, denoted by L1 ≡(δ,C,D) L2, if and only if all
of the followings hold:
1. L1 and L2 have the same schema and tables of the
same name in L1 and L2 have the same number of
records (rows).
2. For each equivalence class of columns defined by δ,
there is a bijection from values of L1 to values of L2.
(By equivalence class of columns defined by δ, we mean
an equivalence class of columns defined by the reflexive,
symmetric, transitive closure of δ.) For a table t and a
column a, let Mt,a denote the bijection corresponding
to the equivalence class of δ in which (t, a) lies. Let v
be the value in some row i of the table t, column a in
L1. Then,
(a) The value in the ith row of table t, column a in
L2 is Mt,a(v).
(b) If v ∈ C, then Mt,a(c) = c.
(c) |v| = |Mt,a(v)|.
3. Let timeStamps(L1) be the sequence of timestamps in
L1 obtained by traversing the tables of L1 in any or-
der and the timestamps within each table in row order.
Let timeStamps(L2) be the timestamps in L2 obtained
similarly, traversing tables in the same order. Then,
EDD(timeStamps(L1), timeStamps(L2), D) holds.
We now intuitively explain the requirements of two plain-
text log L1 and L2 to be equivalent according to our defi-
nition. The first requirement of our definition requires both
L1 and L2 to have the same schema, same table names, and
same number of records. The second requirement states
that for each equivalence class of columns defined by the
reflexive, symmetric, transitive closure of δ, there exists a
bijection mapping M from the plaintext values appearing
in those columns in L1 to the plaintext values appearing
in those columns in L2 such that: (a) All constant values
c appearing in those columns (i.e., c ∈ C) are mapped to
each other; (b) If there is a mapping between two values p1
to p2 according to M, then p1 and p2 are of same length;
(c) If we take any arbitrary row i in any arbitrary column
j (where j belongs to the table T and the equivalence class
in question) in L1 and assume L1.T [i][j] = v1, then if we
apply M over v1, we will get the value of L2.T [i][j], and
vice versa. The final requirement demands that if we take
any two arbitrary displacements d1, d2 ∈ D, any two arbi-
trary timestamps t1i , t
1
j from L1, and the values of the cor-
responding cells in L2 are t
2
i , t
2
j , then the following holds:
t1i + d1 ≤ t
1
j + d2 ⇔ t
2
i + d1 ≤ t
2
j + d2.
We now define the IND-CPLADET game (Chosen Plaintext
Log Attack), which defines what it means for two logs to be
indistinguishable to an adversary Adv under EunomiaDET.
IND-CPLADET game. The IND-CPLADET game is played be-
tween a client or challenger Cl and an adversary Adv for all
large enough security parameters κ.
1. Adv picks a log schema S , the sets C,D and an equality
scheme δ and gives these to Cl.
2. Cl probabilistically generates a set of secret keys K
based on the sufficiently large security parameter κ,
the log schema S , and the equality scheme δ. K
$
←
KeyGenDET(1κ,S , δ).
3. Cl randomly selects a bit b. b
$
← {0, 1}.
4. Adv chooses two plaintext audit logs L0 and L1 such
that both L0,L1 have schema S , L0 ≡(δ,C,D) L1, L0 6=
L1, and sends L0, L1 to Cl.
5. Following the scheme EunomiaDET, Cl deterministically
encrypts Lb according to the key set K to obtain the
encrypted audit log eDBb. It then constructs themOPED
data structure eTb. Adv may observe the construction
of the mOPED data-structure eTb passively. Cl then
sends 〈eDBb, eTb〉 to Adv.
(〈eDBb, eTb〉 ← EncryptLog
DET(Lb,S ,K).)
6. For any constant c ∈ C, if c appears in table t, column
a of Lb, then Cl gives Adv the encryption of c with the
encryption key of column a.
7. Adv runs a probabilistic algorithm that may invoke the
encryption oracle on keys from K but never asks for the
encryption of any value in L0 or L1.
8. Adv outputs its guess b′ of b.
Adv wins the IND-CPLADET game iff b = b′. Let the ran-
dom variable winAdvDET be 1 if the Adv wins and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 2 (Security of EunomiaDET) If deterministic en-
cryption is a pseudorandom function, EunomiaDET is IND-CPLADET
secure, i.e., for any ppt adversary Adv and sufficiently large
κ, Pr[winAdvDET = 1] ≤
1
2
+negl(κ) where the probability is taken
over the random coins used by Adv as well as the random
coins used in choosing keys and the random bit b.
Proof. By hybrid argument. We successively replace
uses of deterministic encryption with a random oracle. If
the Adv can distinguish two consecutive hybrids with non-
negligible probability, it can also distinguish a random oracle
from a pseudorandom function, which is a contradiction.
Intuitively, this theorem says that any adversary cannot
distinguish two equivalent logs if they are encrypted with
EunomiaDET, except with negligible probability.
5.3 Security of EunomiaKH
We now define and prove security for the log encryption
scheme EunomiaKH. The security game, IND-CPLAKH, is sim-
ilar to that for EunomiaDET and uses the same notion of log
equivalence. The proof of security for EunomiaKH reduces to
the ECDDH assumption.
IND-CPLAKH game. The IND-CPLAKH game is played be-
tween a challenger Cl and an adversary Adv for all large
enough security parameters κ. It is very similar to IND-CPLADET
security game but has the following differences. All the en-
cryption is done using the EunomiaKH approach. Addition-
ally, there is one more step after step 5 where the Cl gener-
ates the token list ~∆ according to δ and send its to the Adv.
We do not show the IND-CPLAKH game due to space con-
straint. Adv wins the IND-CPLAKH game iff b = b′. Let the
random variable winAdvKH be 1 if the Adv wins and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 3 (Security of EunomiaKH) If the ECDDH as-
sumption holds and the encryption scheme used in EunomiaKH
is IND-CPA secure, then EunomiaKH is IND-CPLAKH secure,
i.e., for any ppt adversary Adv and sufficiently large κ, the
following holds: Pr[winAdvKH = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(κ), where the
probability is taken over the random coins used by Adv as
well as the random coins used in choosing keys and the ran-
dom bit b.
Proof. By hybrid argument, we reduce to the IND-CPA
security of encryption and the security of AKH [34, Defini-
tion 4]. The latter relies on the ECDDH assumption.
Generalizing security definitions. IND-CPLADET and
IND-CPLAKH security definitions are presented as a game in
which the adversary and the challenger interact for a single
round. However, it is possible to lift our current security def-
initions for polynomial round of interactions between the ad-
versary and challenger. To achieve this, we need the require-
ment that for two consecutive rounds (i and i+1) of interac-
tions where Li0, L
i
1 are adversary-chosen plaintext equivalent
logs at step i and Li+10 , L
i+1
1 are adversary-chosen plaintext
equivalent logs at step i+ 1, Li+10 ≥ L
i
0 and L
i+1
1 ≥ L
i
1.
Information leakage. Our security definitions state
that the only information leaked by our scheme is which
log equivalence class a particular plaintext audit log belongs
to. Note that, a log’s membership to an equivalence class is
a symbolic representation of all information that may leak
by Eunomia. Precisely, by analyzing the log equivalence def-
inition (Definition 1) it is possible to infer all information
that may leak by Eunomia. For instance, according to Defini-
tion 1, two equivalent plaintext logs have the same frequency
distribution in any column of the log. However, two logs
in different equivalence class may have different frequency
distribution in any column. Hence, Eunomia leaks the fre-
quency distribution in any column.
6. AUDITING ALGORITHM
We now present our auditing algorithm ereduce, which
is an enhancement of its plaintext counterpart reduce [17].
We choose to enhance reduce as it supports a rich set
of policies including HIPAA and GLBA. Further, reduce
has support for incompleteness in the audit log. We write
ereduceDET to denote the audit algorithm instance for logs
encrypted under EunomiaDET and ereduceKH for EunomiaKH-
encrypted audit logs. The main difference between reduce
and ereduceKH/DET is that ereduceKH/DET requires the spe-
cialmOPED data-structure to evaluate the timeOrder pred-
icate whereas reduce directly checks the linear integer con-
straint. We will describe ereduceKH in detail and point out
the difference between these two instances.
6.1 Auxiliary Definitions
A substitution σ is a finite map that maps variables to
value, provenance pairs. Each element of the range of a sub-
stitution is of form 〈v, ℓ〉 in which v refers to the value that
the variable is mapped to and ℓ refers to the provenance
of v. The provenance ℓ refers to the source of the value
and is of form p.a where p represents a table name and a
represents a column name. We commonly write a substitu-
tion σ as a finite list of elements, each element having the
form: 〈x, vh, ve, ℓ〉. For any variable x in σ’s domain, we use
σ(x).hash, σ(x).cipher, and σ(x).ℓ to select the hash value
(i.e., vh), the ciphertext value (i.e., ve), and the provenance
(i.e., ℓ), respectively.
We say substitution σ1 extends σ2 (denoted σ1 ≥ σ2) if
σ1 agrees with all variable mapping in σ2’s domain. Given a
substitution σ we define [σ] = {〈x, tb.cl〉|∃v.σ(x) = 〈v, tb.cl〉}.
We use σ ↓ X, where X ⊆ domain(σ), to denote the substi-
tution σ′ such that σ ≥ σ′ and domain of σ′ only contains
variables from the sequence X. We can lift the ↓ operation
for a set of substitutions Σ. We use • to denote the identity
substitution. We say a substitution σ satisfy a formula g on
a log eL if replacing each free variable x in g with concrete
value σ(x).hash results in a formula that is true on eL.
6.2 Algorithm
Key functions of ereduce is summarized below.
ereduceKH(eL, ϕ, ~∆, σ) is the top level function that takes
as input an EunomiaKH encrypted audit log eL, a constant
encrypted policy ϕ, a set of tokens ~∆, and an input substi-
tution σ, and returns a residual policy ψ. ψ represents a for-
mula containing the part of the original policy ϕ that cannot
be evaluated due to incomplete information in eL. We use
• as the input substitution to the initial call to ereduceKH.
ereduce (resp., êsat and esat) evaluates the input formula
from left to right, respecting operator precedence.
êsat
KH
(eL, g, ~∆, σ) is an auxiliary function used by ereduceKH
while evaluating quantifiers to get all finite substitutions
that satisfy a formula. It takes as input an EunomiaKH en-
crypted audit log eL, a constant encrypted formula g, a set
of tokens ~∆, and an input substitution σ, and returns all
finite substitutions for free variables of g that extends σ and
satisfy g with respect to eL.
esatKH(eL,p(~t), ~∆, σ) is an auxiliary function used by êsat
KH
for evaluating all finite substitutions for a given predicate
with respect to an input substitution. The inputs eL, ~∆,
and σ have their usual meaning. p(~t) is a constant encrypted
predicate. This function returns all finite substitutions for
free variables of p(~t) that extend the input substitution σ
and satisfy p(~t) with respect to eL. The implementation
of esatKH is audit log representation dependent. For our
case, evaluation of timeOrder predicate esatKH consults the
mOPED data structure whereas evaluation of other predi-
cates queries the database representing the audit log.
For ease of exposition, we drop the superscript KH from
ereduceKH, êsat
KH
, and esatKH in the discussion below.
ereduce eagerly evaluates as much of the input policy ϕ
as it can; in case it cannot evaluate portions of ϕ due to
incompleteness in eL, it returns that portion of ϕ as part of
the result. The return value of ereduce is thus a formula in
our logic ψ (i.e., residual formula). Auditing with ereduce
is an iterative process. When the current log eL is ex-
tended with additional information (i.e., removing some in-
completeness), resulting in the new log eL1 (viz., eL1 ≥ eL),
one can call ereduce again with the residual formula ψ as
the input policy and eL1 as the input log.
We present selected cases of ereduce in Figure 2. The
conditions above the bar are premises and the condition be-
low the bar is the conclusion. We use the notation f(~a) ⇓ ψ
to mean function f returns ψ when applied to arguments ~a.
p(~t′)← ∀ti ∈ Var.p(~t)[ti 7→ 〈Adjust(σ(ti).hash,
∆σ(ti).ℓ→p.i), σ(ti).cipher〉]
P ← eL(p(~t′))
ereduce(eL, p(~t), ~∆, σ) ⇓ P
R-P
ereduce(eL, ϕ1, ~∆, σ) ⇓ ϕ
′
1
ereduce(eL, ϕ2, ~∆, σ) ⇓ ϕ
′
2 ψ ← ϕ
′
1 ∨ ϕ
′
2
ereduce(eL, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ~∆, σ) ⇓ ψ
R-
∨
êsat(eL, g, ~∆, σ) ⇓ Σ′
∀σi ∈ Σ
′.ereduce(eL, ϕ, ~∆, σi) ⇓ ϕi
ϕ′ ← ∀~x.(g ∧ ~x /∈ [Σ′ ↓ ~x] → ϕ)
ψ ←
∧
i
ϕi ∧ ϕ
′
ereduce(eL,∀~x.(g → ϕ), ~∆, σ) ⇓ ψ
R-∀
Figure 2: ereduce description
When the input formula to ereduce is a predicate p(~t)
(R-P case), ereduce uses σ and ~∆ to replace all variables
in p(~t) with concrete values (with proper hash adjustments)
to obtain a new ground predicate p(~t′). (A ground predicate
only has constants as arguments.) Then it consults eL to
check whether p(~t′) exists. If eL(p(~t′)) = uu, indicating the
log doesn’t have enough information, then ereduce returns
p(~t′). Otherwise, it returns either true or false depending on
whether there is a row in table p with hash values match-
ing ~t′. For example, let us assume that ereduce is called
with the input substitution σ = [〈p1, v
h
k1
, ∗, t.cl〉, . . .] and the
input predicate activeRole(p1, 〈doctor
h
k3
, ∗〉) (p1 is a variable
and doctor is a constant). ∗ represents ciphertext and is not
important for this example. Let us assume that the column
1 of the activeRole table uses the keys (k2, ∗) whereas in σ,
the hash value mapped to p1 is generated using k1. Hence,
we have to change the value vhk1 to v
h
k2
using the adjustment
key ∆k1 7→k2 ∈ ~∆. Then, using the following SQL query we
check whether a row with the appropriate hash values ex-
ists: “select * from activeRole where column1Hash=vhk2 and
column2Hash=doctorhk3”. If such a row exists, then ⊤ is re-
turned; otherwise, ⊥ is returned. When ereduce is called
for timeOrder, the same hash adjustment applies before the
mOPED data structure is consulted.
In rule R-
∨
, ereduce is recursively called for each of the
sub-clauses in the disjunction: ϕ1 (resp., for ϕ2) and the
returned residual formula is ϕ′1 ∨ ϕ
′
2.
When the input formula is of form ∀~x(g → ϕ) (R-∀ case),
we first use the function êsat (described below) to get all
substitutions Σ′ for ~x that extend σ and satisfy g with re-
spect to eL. As we require policies to pass EQ mode check,
it is ensured that there is a finite number of such substitu-
tions for ~x. For each of these substitutions σi ∈ Σ
′, we then
recursively call ereduce for ϕ to obtain residual formula ϕi.
Then the returned residual formula is
∧
i ϕi ∧ ϕ
′ where ϕ′
ensures that the same substitutions σi for ~x are not checked
again when eL is extended.
Next, we explain selected rules for êsat (presented below)
with an example.
Σ← esat(eL, p(~t), ~∆, σ)
êsat(eL, p(~t), ~∆, σ) ⇓ Σ
S-P
êsat(eL, g1, ~∆, σ) ⇓ Σ
′
∀σi ∈ Σ
′.êsat(eL, g2, ~∆, σi) ⇓ Σi
êsat(eL, g1 ∧ g2, ~∆, σ) ⇓
⋃
i
Σi
S-
∧
Let us assume êsat is called with the formula g ≡ p(x) ∧
q(x, y) and substitution σ = ∅ (empty) as input. The S-
∧ rule applies and first êsat is recursive called on p(x) and
σ = ∅. Now, the rule S-P applies. Here, x is not in the
domain of σ, so the esat function consults eL (i.e., using
SQL query like: “select * from p”) to find concrete values of x
to make p(x) true. Let us assume that we get 〈vhk1 , ∗〉 (i.e., k1
is used to hash the column 1 of table p). Hence, esat returns
the substitution σ1 = [〈x, v
h
k1
, ∗, p.1〉] as output. Going back
to the S-∧ rule, now the second premise of S-∧ calls êsat
for q(x, y) with each substitution obtained after evaluating
p(x), in our case, σ1. Let us assume that column 1 and 2
of table q is hashed with key k2 and k3, respectively. While
evaluating, q(x, y) with σ1, S-P rule is used. σ1 already
maps variable x but with key k1, thus esat converts v
h
k1
to
vhk2 using token ∆p.1→q.1. It then tries to get concrete values
for y (with respect to given value of x) by consulting table q
in eL using the following SQL query: “select column2Hash,
column2Cipher from q where column1Hash=vhk2”. Assume
the SQL query returns 〈whk3 , ∗〉 for column2 (i.e., y), esat
returns the substitution [〈x, vhk1 , ∗, p.1〉, 〈y,w
h
k3
, ∗, q.2〉].
Differences between ereduce under EunomiaDET and
EunomiaKH As we have shown, ereduceKH tracks the prove-
nance of encrypted data value required for audit. This is
not required by ereduceDET. For ereduceDET, the substi-
tution simply σ maps variables to deterministic ciphertext.
Further, in the R-P and S-P rule, no adjustment is needed.
6.3 Properties
We have proved the correctness of both ereduceDET and
ereduceKH. We show the theorem for ereduceKH below.
Theorem 4 states that the decrypted result of ereduce and
the result of reduce are equal with high probability. The
results may not be equal due to hash collisions. Due to
space requirement we do not show the proof here. Here,
EncryptSubstitutionKH function encrypts a plaintext substitu-
tion with provenance to an encrypted one and is very similar
to the EncryptPolicyConstantsKH function (see Section 4.3).
Theorem 4 (Correctness of ereduceKH) For all plain-
text policies ϕP and ψP, for all constant encrypted policies ϕE
and ψE, for all database schema S, for all plaintext audit logs
L = 〈DB, T 〉, for all encrypted audit logs eL = 〈eDB, eT 〉,
for all plaintext substitution σP, for all encrypted substitu-
tion σE, for all χI , for all equality scheme δ, for all security
parameter κ, for all encryption keys K, for all token list ~∆, if
all of the following holds: (1) χI ⊢ ϕP : δ, (2) [σP] ⊇ χI , (3)
K = KeyGenKH(κ,S), ~∆ = GenerateToken(S , δ,K), (4) eL =
EncryptLogKH(L,S ,K), (5) ϕE = EncryptPolicyConstants
KH(ϕP
,K), (6) AKH key adjustment is correct, (7) σE = EncryptSub
stitutionKH(σP,K), (8) ψP = reduce(L, σP, ϕP), (9) ψE =
ereduceKH(eL, ϕE, ~∆, σE), and (10) ψ
′
P = DecryptPolicyConst
antsKH(ψE,K), then ψp = ψ
′
P with high probability.
The correctness theorem for ereduceDET states that the
decrypted result of ereduce and the result of reduce are
equal. We omit the formal statement of the correctness the-
orem for ereduceDET.
The security of ereduce follows directly from Theorems
2 and 3. As the security theorem does not restrict what
kind of computation the adversary runs in polynomial time,
ereduce can be viewed as one instance of such computation.
Hence, ereduce does not leak any additional information.
7. EQ MODE CHECK
We now present EQ mode check. which extends mode
check [2] introduced in logic programming. The EQ mode
check is a static analysis of the policy that serves two pur-
poses: (i) It ensures that ereduce algorithm terminates for
any policy that passes the check and (ii) It outputs the equal-
ity scheme δ of the policy, which is used in both EunomiaDET
and EunomiaKH (see Section 4). The EQ mode check runs
in the linear time of the size of the policy. The EQ mode
check extends mode check described in Garg et al. [17] by
additionally carrying provenance and key-adjustment infor-
mation. Next, we introduce modes, then we explain our EQ
mode checking rules.
Mode specification. The concept of “modes” comes from
logic programming [2]. Let us use the following predicate
as an example: Predicate tagged(m,q, a) is true when the
message m is tagged with principal q’s attribute a. Assum-
ing the number of possible messages in English language is
infinite, the number of concrete values for variables m, q,
and a for which tagged holds is also infinite. However, if
we are given a concrete message (i.e., concrete value for the
variable m), then the number of concrete values for q and a
for which tagged holds is finite. Hence, we say the predicate
tagged’s argument position 1 is the input position (denoted
by “+”) whereas the argument positions 2 and 3 are output
argument positions (denoted by “−”). We call such a de-
scription of input and output specification of a predicate its
mode specification. Mode specification of a given predicate
signifies that given concrete values for variables in the input
position, the number of concrete values for variables in the
output position for which the given predicate holds true is fi-
nite. Hence tagged(m+, q−, a−) is a valid mode specification
whereas tagged(m−, q−, a+) is not.
EQ mode checking. EQ mode check uses the mode spec-
ification of predicates to check whether a formula is well-
moded. EQ mode check has two types of judgements: χI ⊢g
g : 〈χO, δ〉 for guards, and χI ⊢ ϕ : δ for policy formulas.
Each element of the sets χI and χO is a pair of form 〈x,p.a〉
which signifies that we obtained concrete value for the vari-
able x with provenance p.a (i.e., source of the value).
The top level judgement χI ⊢ ϕ : δ states that given
ground values for variables in set χI , the formula ϕ is well-
moded and that audit ϕ would require the equality checking
for column pairs given by δ. We call a given policy ϕ well-
moded if there exists a δ for which we can derive the following
judgement: {} ⊢ ϕ : δ. The judgement ⊢ uses ⊢g as a sub-
judgement in the quantifier case and we explain ⊢g first. The
judgement χI ⊢g g : 〈χO, δ〉 states that: Given concrete
values for variables in the set χI , the number of concrete
values for variables in the set χO (χO is a subset of the free
variables of g) for which the formula g holds true is finite.
It also outputs the column pairs which may be checked for
equality during evaluation of g.
∀k ∈ I(p).tk ∈ Var→ tk ∈ FE(χI)
χO = χI ∪
⋃
j∈O(p)∧tj∈Var∧tj /∈FE(χI)
〈tj , p.j〉
δ={〈p′.i,p.l〉|0<l≤α(p)∧tl∈Var∧〈tl,p
′.i〉∈χI}
χI ⊢g p(t1, . . . , tn) : 〈χO, δ〉
g-Pred
χI ⊢g g1 : 〈χ, δ1〉 χ ⊢g g2 : 〈χO, δ2〉
χI ⊢g g1 ∧ g2 : 〈χO, δ1 ∪ δ2〉
g-Conj
χI ⊢g g1 : 〈χ1, δ1〉 χI ⊢g g2 : 〈χ2, δ2〉
χI ⊢g g1 ∨ g2 : 〈χ1 ⋓ χ2, δ1 ∪ δ2〉
g-Disj
Figure 3: Selected χI ⊢g g : 〈χO, δ〉 judgements
Selected mode checking rules for guards are listed in Fig-
ure 3. We explain these rules using an example. We show
how to check the following formula g ≡ (p(x−)∨q(x−, z−))∧
r(x+, y−) with χI = {} (χI = {} signifies that we do not
have concrete values for any variables yet). The function I
(resp., O) takes as input a predicate p and returns all in-
put (resp., output) argument positions of p. For instance,
I(r) = {1} and O(r) = {2}.
First, G-CONJ rule (gc1 ∧ g
c
2) applies. The first premise
of G-CONJ requires that gc1 ≡ (p(x
−) ∨ q(x−, z−)) is well
moded with χI = {}. Now, G-DISJ (g
d
1 ∨ g
d
2) rule can
be used to check the well modedness of gc1 with χI = {}.
The first and second premise require gd1 ≡ p(x
−) and gd2 ≡
q(x−, z−) to be independently well moded with the input
χI = {}. While evaluating p(x
−) with χI = {} we see
the G-PRED rule is applicable. The first premise checks
whether all input variables of p, none in this case, are in-
cluded in χI ; this is trivially satisfied. We use an auxiliary
function FE for checking this, defined as follows: FE(χI) =
{x | ∃p, i.〈x, p.i〉 ∈ χI}. After evaluating p, we will get con-
crete values for variable(s) in output position of p (i.e., x
in this case with provenance p.1), hence χO = {〈x, p.1〉},
which is expressed in premise 2. Finally, we did not have
concrete values for x in χI , so we would not need any com-
parison, hence δ = {} (premise 3). Similarly, we can derive,
{} ⊢g q(x
−, z−) : 〈{〈x, q.1〉, 〈z, q.2〉}, {}〉. Once we have de-
termined both gd1 and g
d
2 are well moded, we see that we are
only guaranteed to have concrete value for variable x (if gd1
is true we will not get concrete value for z) but x can either
have provenance p.1 or q.1. We have to keep track of both,
which is captured using the ⋓ operator defined as follows:
χ1 ⋓χ2 = {〈x, p1.a1〉 | ∃p2, a2.((〈x, p1.a1〉 ∈ χ1∧〈x, p2.a2〉 ∈
χ2)
∨
(〈x, p1.a1〉 ∈ χ2 ∧ 〈x, p2.a2〉 ∈ χ1)).}. So we have,
{} ⊢g g
c
1 : 〈{〈x, p.1〉, 〈x, q.1〉}, {}〉.
Now let’s go back to the second premise of G-CONJ,
which requires that r(x+, y−) is well-moded with respect
to χ = {〈x, p.1〉, 〈x, q.1〉}. The G-PRED rule is applicable
again for checking this. The first premise, requiring variables
in input argument position (i.e., x in this case) are given by
χI , is satisfied. According to the second premise, we will ad-
ditionally get concrete value for y with provenance r.2 hence
χO = {〈x, p.1〉, 〈x, q.1〉, 〈y, r.2〉}. Finally, concrete value for
x (with provenance p.1 and q.1) is needed while evaluating
r (x is in input argument position 1 of r), hence we need to
check for equality between the following column pairs, p.1,
r.1 and q.1, r.1, i.e., δ = {〈p.1, r.1〉, 〈q.1, r.1〉}. The direc-
tionality of the pairs, e.g., 〈p.1, r.1〉, matters for efficiency.
For instance, we are given a concrete value hashed with key
kp.1 for variable x. While evaluating r we would need con-
crete value of x (x is in input argument position of r). Now,
if we are given the token ∆r.1→p.1 we cannot directly evalu-
ate r without incurring additional computational overhead.
Top-level mode checking rules for policy formulas are very
similar to those for guards, except that formulas do not
ground variables. We show the rule for universal quantifi-
cation below. The audit algorithm checks formulas of form
∀~x.(g → ϕ) by first obtaining finite number of substitutions
for ~x that satisfy g and then checking whether ϕ holds true
for each of these substitution.
χI ⊢g g : 〈χO, δg〉 ~x ⊆ FE(χO)
fv(g) ⊆ FE(χI) ∪ {~x} χO ⊢ ϕ : δc
χI ⊢ ∀~x.(g → ϕ) : δg ∪ δc
Univ
The first premise of UNIV checks that we have only finite
number of substitutions for ~x that satisfy g with respect
to χI and with equality scheme δg. This is necessary for
termination while checking universal formulas as the domain
of the variables can be infinite. We then check whether we
have substitutions for all quantified variables ~x and also all
the free variables of g. Finally, we inductively check whether
ϕ is well-moded with respect to the ground variables we
obtained while evaluating g with equality scheme δc. Then,
the resulting equality scheme is δg ∪ δc.
8. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We report on our empirical evaluation of ereduce on the
EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH schemes. We run experiments
on a 2.67GHz Intel Xeon X5650 CPU with Debian Linux 7.6
and 50GB of RAM, of which no more than 3.0 GB is used.
SQLite version 3.8.7.1 is used to store the plaintext and en-
crypted logs. We aggressively index all database columns in
input argument positions as specified in mode specifications.
In EunomiaDET, the index is built over deterministically en-
crypted values; in EunomiaKH, the index is built over hashed
values. For deterministic encryption, we use AES with a
variation of the CMC mode [22] with a fixed IV and a 16
byte block size. We use 256 bit keys. For the AKH scheme,
we use the library by Popa et al. [33]. The underlying el-
liptic curve is the NIST-approved NID X9 62 prime192v1.
We use privacy policies derived from the GLBA and HIPAA
privacy rules and cover 4 and 13 representative clauses of
these rules, respectively.
Figure 4: Experimental results HIPAA
We use synthetically generated plaintext audit logs. Given
an input policy and a desired number of privacy sensitive ac-
tions, our audit log generation algorithm randomly decides
whether each action will be policy compliant or not. To
generate log entries for a compliant action, the algorithm
traverses the abstract syntax tree of the policy and gener-
ates instances of atoms that together satisfy the policy. For
the non-compliant actions, we randomly choose atoms to
falsify a necessary condition. Our synthetic log generator
also outputs the mOPED data structure but with plain-
text values for timestamps. We generate logs with 2000 to
14000 privacy-sensitive actions. Each plaintext log is en-
crypted with both the EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH schemes.
The maximum plaintext audit log size we considered is 17
MB. The corresponding maximum encrypted log sizes in
EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH are 67.3MB and 267MB, respec-
tively. Most of the size of EunomiaKH-encrypted log comes
from the keyed hashes.
We measure the relative overhead of running ereduce on
logs encrypted with EunomiaDET and EunomiaKH, choosing
reduce on plaintext audit log as the baseline. We exper-
iment with both RAM-backed and disk-backed versions of
SQLite. We report here only the memory-backed results (the
disk-backed results are similar). Figure 4 shows the average
execution time per privacy-sensitive action for the HIPAA
policy in all three configurations (GLBA results are similar).
The number of privacy-sensitive actions (and, hence, the log
size) varies on the x-axis. The overhead of EunomiaDET is
very low, between 3% and 9%. This is unsurprising, because
no cryptographic operations are needed during audit. The
overhead comes from the need to read and compare longer
(encrypted) fields in the log and from having to use the
mOPED data structure. With EunomiaKH, overheads are
much higher, ranging from 63% to 406%. These overheads
come entirely from two sources: the cost of reading a much
larger database and the cost of performing hash adjustments
to check equality of values in different columns. We observe
that the overhead due to the increased database size is more
than that due to hash adjustment. For the policies we exper-
imented with, the per-action overhead due to database size
grows linearly, but the overhead due to hash adjustments
is relatively constant. There is substantial room (i.e., 30%
of the total overhead incurred by EunomiaKH) for improving
the efficiency of ereduce on EunomiaKH, e.g., by caching
previous key-adjustments, which we currently do not do.
9. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review the existing work that
are most relevant to our approach.
Functional encryption: Function encryption scheme [11,
20, 28, 30] enables one (possibly with the possession of some
tokens) to calculate a function value over encrypted argu-
ments. The output of the function is in plaintext unlike ho-
momorphic encryption [18]. Our approach can be viewed as
attempting to mimic functional encryption where the func-
tion is compliance checking of a given policy. We have the
following differences with functional encryption: (i) some
of the output can be encrypted in our case, (ii) we have
multiple arguments each of which can be encrypted with
different keys, and (iii) also we cannot hide the function be-
ing computed as the policy is public knowledge. However,
Goldwasser et al. [19] introduce multi-input functional en-
cryption in which multiple arguments are considered.
Predicate encryption: Property-preserving encryption [31]
or predicate encryption [38, 12, 25] can be viewed as a special
case of the functional encryption where the function returns
boolean value. The compliance checking can be viewed as
a variation of predicate encryption where the predicate out-
puts ‘0’ for violation of the policy and ‘1’ for satisfaction.
Traditionally, predicate encryption schemes consider argu-
ments encrypted with a single encryption key whereas in our
case we have arguments encrypted with multiple encryption
keys. Pandey and Rouselakis [31] present several notions of
security for symmetric predicate encryption and constructs
one such encryption scheme for the checking the orthogonal-
ity of two encrypted vectors (~x · ~y
?
= 0 mod p). Our security
definition IND-ECPLA is inspired by their LoR security no-
tion. Shen et al. [38] present a symmetric predicate encryp-
tion scheme which supports inner product queries. Their
approach can also be used for equality checking but using
it will result in the database indexing to be unusable in our
case. They introduce a notion of security called predicate
privacy. Our approach cannot provide predicate privacy as
the policy is known to the adversary.
Structured encryption: Chase and Kamara [13] intro-
duce structured encryption for structured data and which
maintains the structure of the data after the encryption.
They construct encryption schemes for graph structures and
allow adjacency queries, neighboring queries, and also fo-
cused subgraph queries. Our encryption of the audit logs
could be viewed as an instance of structured encryption
where the queries we are interested in, are relevant to com-
pliance checking with respect to a given policy.
Searchable audit log: Waters et al. [41] present a frame-
work in which they allow both confidentiality and integrity
protection with the ability to search the encrypted audit logs
based on some keywords. They use hash chains for integrity
protection and use identity-based encryption [10] with ex-
tracted keywords to enable searching the audit log [9]. In
our current work, we only consider confidentiality of the data
and assume existence of complementary techniques to ensure
integrity of the audit log [35, 36, 26, 24]. The policies against
which we check the audit log is more expressive than what
they consider. Additionally, we require time-stamp compar-
ison which is their framework does not allow.
Searchable encrypted audit log: Waters et al. present
a framework in which they provide both confidentiality and
integrity protection with the ability to search the encrypted
audit logs based on keywords [41]. They use use identity-
based encryption [10] with extracted keywords to enable
searching the audit log [9]. We only consider confidentiality
of the data and assume existence of complementary tech-
niques to ensure integrity of the audit log [36]. The policies
we consider are more expressive than theirs and we support
time-stamp comparison which is not present in their frame-
work.
Order-preserving encryption: Boldyreva et al. [8] present
a symmetric encryption scheme that maintains the order of
the plaintext data which does not satisfy the ideal IND-OCPA
security definition. Popa et al. present the mOPE scheme
which we enhance to support timestamp comparison with
displacements [32]. Recently, Kerschbaum and Schro¨pfer
present a keyless order preserving encryption scheme for out-
sourced data [27]. In their approach, the owner of the plain-
text data is required to keep a dictionary of mapping from
plaintext to ciphertext which is undesirable in our scenario.
Querying outsourced database: Hacigu¨mu¨s¸ et al. [21]
develop a system that allows querying over encrypted data.
Their strategy is to ask the client to decrypt data to enable
operations on the encrypted data. Tu et al. [40] introduces
split client/server query execution for processing analytical
queries on encrypted databases. Eunomia does not require
any query processing on the client side as it is untrusted.
Damiani et al. [15] developed a secure indexing approach for
querying an encrypted database. We do not require modifi-
cation to the indexing algorithm of the DBMS.
cryptDB developed by Popa et al. [33] allows queries over
encrypted databases. Their goal is to leave the front-end of
the application running on the client side, untouched and
relying on a trusted proxy to perform appropriate encryp-
tions and decryptions of the queries and the results. Our
setting is different in that our application runs in the cloud
without requiring the existence of a trusted proxy. Unlike
cryptDB, Eunomia supports a restricted set of SQL queries
for auditing. We prove end-to-end security guarantees of our
algorithm, which has not been done for cryptDB.
Privacy policy compliance checking: Prior work on
logic-based compliance checking algorithms focus on plain-
text logs [6, 5, 7, 14, 17]. We are the first to use logic-based
approach to check encrypted logs for policy compliance.
Auditing retention policies: Lu et al. [29] presents a
framework for auditing the changes to database with re-
spect to a retention policy. They also consider retention
history being incomplete. However, they work on plaintext
audit log. To support their queries Eunomia needs to be
enhanced.
10. SUMMARY
We presented an auditing algorithm that checks compli-
ance over encrypted audit logs with respect to an expressive
class of privacy policies. We introduced a novel notion of au-
dit log equivalence that enables us to obtain an end-to-end
security definition that precisely captures the information
leakage during the auditing process. We then prove secure,
two instances of the auditing algorithm which differ in the
encryption scheme, under this definition. Empirical evalua-
tion demonstrates that both instances of our algorithm have
low to moderate overhead compared to a baseline algorithm
that only supports plaintext audit logs.
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